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Abstract
The first Tethered Satellite System mission (TSS-1) is manifested for Shuttle Flight STS-44 in
January of 1991. The TSS mission presents a new challenge to engineers, requiring advanced
guidance, navigation and control concepts. As an example, current navigational systems track the
Orbiter exclusively and do not model the accelerations induced by the tether on the Shuttle. Due to
the offset of the center of mass of the system from the that of the Shuttle, the navigational system
assumes the tracking data are biased, and tracks the center of mass of the system. This offset can
be quite large, to several hundreds of feet. As a result, determination of the navigational state of the
Shuttle bec6mes more difficult and less certain.
Current NASA flight rules require that the navigational state of the Orbiter at deorbit bum be known
to an accuracy of 20 nautical miles. Response of the Shuttle crew to this contingency may involve
cutting the tether prior to a complete retrieval. This paper examines the degradation of the
navigational state accuracy as modelled by Shuttle navigation systems.
Responses to the loss of communication scenario are proposed for two cases. The f'trst case
examines navigational performance during a "nominal" at_tude profile. The second case is identical
to the first, with the inclusion of modelled tether electrodynamical forces.
Comparisons of trajectories propagated from the onboard navigational state-vector and a reference
ephemeris state-vector were performed, with the tether cut simulated at various points during the
mission. Additionally, updates to the onboard navigational state via ground uplinks were provided
prior to the assumed loss of communication. Through these comparisons, the onboard navigation
state error was determined. Alternative responses result from efforts to minimize this error during
the various phases of TS S-1 deployment. These results demonstrated existing NASA flight rules
could be violated by cutting the tether, and suggests responses to a loss of communications
contingency to maintain a more accurate navigational state.
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lntroduqtign
Perhaps the most exciting and challenging Shuttle mission ever flown is scheduled
for STS 44, in late January, 1991. A satellite will be deployed in an nominally outward
radial direction on a conducting tether during the first Tethered Satellite System
mission (TSS-1). The satellite is designed by an italian aerospace company, Aeritalia.
Primary objectives for the mission are to demonstrate closed loop control of a
tethered object, and to examine the behavior of a current carrying tether passing
through the Earth's magnetic field.
The deployment of the satellite moves the center of mass of the system away from
that of the Orbiter. For a twenty kilometer long tether, this separation can be as great
as 100 meters. Additionally, the presence of the tether results in a tension force
continually experienced by the Shuttle, a force unmodelled by current Shuttle
ground-based navigational systems onboard Shuttle. Although the Inertial
Measurement Units (IMUs) detect tether accelerations, these accelerations are within
the noise thresholds. Therefore this data is not passed on to the navigational systems.
These two facts make navigation difficult. When this force is suddenly removed, as in
a cut or break of the tether, the Shuttle's orbit changes, and the system center of
mass returns instantly to the Shuttle. The onboard navigation system is unaware of
the removal of the tether, resulting in rapid navigational state degradation.
An accurate Shuttle state can be determined following a tether cut, given
communications with ground based systems. The ground navigation systems are able
to determine the new orbit of the Shuttle, then uplink an accurate state, resetting the
onboard systems. Shuttle navigation proceeds as if the tether was never present. In
a loss of communications contingency, however, an accurate updated state is
unavailable to onboard systems.
This paper examines Shuttle navigational response to the removal of the tether.
Additionally, responses are suggested to a loss of communications in an effort to
minimize navigational error.
During a loss of communications, the onboard navigation systems perform
unsatisfactorily, as no uplink can be provided. Efforts to minimize onboard
navigational error growth result in responses to a loss of communications
contingency. Navigation performance is improved to acceptable standards by
reeling in the tether as much as possible prior to cutting.
Analysis tools used for the research of this paper include three simulations: The
Shuttle Tethered Object Control Simulation (STOCS), a high fidelity engineering
simulation of the TSS-1 mission (Reference I); the Shuttle Environment Navigation
Simulation for Orbit and Rendezvous (SENSOR), an onboard navigation simulation
(Reference 2); and the Standalone Orbital Navigation (SONAV) program, a ground
system emulator (Reference 3). An additional tool is the Houston Operations
Predictor/Estimator (HOPE). HOPE was used primarily as a propagator of Shuttle state
in the absence of tether accelerations (Reference 4).
Effect of Tether on Shuttle Navigation Systems and State
Current navigational systems track the Orbiter exclusively and do not model the
accelerations imparted to the Shuttle by the tether. These accelerations include
gravity gradients, and the aerodynamic and electrodynamic drag of the tether. The
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gravity gradient accelerations are dominant of these three. Because the existing
ground navigation systems do not incorporate these accelerations in their
propagations, the combination of a propagation of the previous state and a weighted
least-squaresreduction of the observationdata results in a state vector for that point
in the TSS where the gravity gradient accelerations are zero. This point is
approximately the center of mass of the system. Effectively, the ground navigation
systems assumethe observationsare biased by the difference in position between the
system center of mass and that of the Shuttle. As a result, the navigational accuracy
of the shuttle deteriorates rapidly, particularly during reel-out, when these two
points are moving apart. Reference 5 presents a further discussion of tether effects
on inertial navigation.
To the onboard navigational systems, the presence of the tether goes completely
unnoticed. Accelerations of the same magnitude as the tether tension appear as noise
to the navigational systems. These forces are therefore not considered in the
onboard state propagation.
The comparison of the ground ephemeris for the Shuttle and the simulated tethered
trajectory in Figure 1 illustrates the effect of tethered operations on Shuttle
navigation. During the initial phases of the mission (i.e. reel-out, see Figure 2 for a
tether length profile), the navigational state error grows rapidly. Following the first
uplink during the onstation portion of the mission, the ground system ephemeris
matches the simulation quite closely. Navigation performance improves when the
difference in the position vectors of the system center of mass and the Shuttle center
of mass remains relatively constant, as it does during the onstation portion of the
mission. The ground navigation systems predict the state of the Orbiter with greater
accuracy, much more so then when the observation data biases are constantly
changing.
Removal of the Tether
When a tether cut removes the TSS gravity gradient accelerations from the Shuttle,
the ground navigation systems detect a displacement of the target's center of mass.
Because the forces not modelled in the the ground system propagation are no longer
present, the ground system no longer treats the observational data as biased, and
once again generates state vectors for the center of mass of the Orbiter.
Just as the tether force went undetected while the tether was attached, the absence of
the tether force also goes unnoticed. The onboard systems continue to propagate a
state of the Shuttle determined with the tether attached, resulting in rapid
navigational error growth. An uplink of a state-vector from the ground ephemeris
resets the onboard state, however, and the onboard systems perform correctly.
At this point it is important to point out a limitation of the Shuttle navigational
systems. The displacement of the center of mass following a tether cut can be
thought of as an an acceleration being applied to the Shuttle. If the Shuttle
experiences a large unmodelled force, ground navigation requires one full
revolution of observation data to redefine the Orbiter's orbital energy. During this
time, no uplink is provided to onboard systems. Consequently, the onboard navigation
error becomes excessive (Figure 3).
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Figure 1" Comparison of Ground System vs. Simulated Trajectories
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Figure 2: Tether Length Profile for Nominal and Electrodynamic Missions
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Simulation of a Cut Tether
Two mission profiles were considered in the study of an immediate cut and return
response. The Shuttle was in an local vertical, local horizontal (LVLH 1) attitude hold
for both profiles, with a constant pitch angle of 25 degrees, zero roll and yaw.
The first profile, considered a nominal case, assumes no current flows through the
tether during any portion of the mission. The second is identical to the first, with the
current turned on during the onstation portions of the mission.
A propagation of a Shuttle state-vector served as a simulation of Shuttle trajectory
following a cut tether. The vector was propagated with gravitational and
environmental accelerations, but without tether tension force. Assumptions
validating this method of simulation begin with the assumption the cut is placed at
the boom tip. By putting the cut at the boom tip, the dynamic behavior of recoiling
tether need not be considered.
An additional assumption pertains to the change in energy of the Orbiter. If it is
assumed a negligible amount of tether energy is imparted to the Orbiter as a result of
cutting the tether, a propagation excluding tether related forces of the Shuttle state-
vector is a valid simulation of a cut. Furthermore, in the STOCS generated trajectories
1The LVLH coordinate system is a right-handed cartesian coordinate system with its Z
axis pointed toward the center of mass of the Earth, and in the instantaneous orbital
plane. The Y axis is formed by taking the cross product of the position and velocity
vectors, in that order. The X axis is mutually onhogonal to the Y and Z axes.
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presented here, a massless tether was used. This assumption neglects transmitted
tether energy from sources such wave transmission.
HOPE was used as the propagator for generation of post-cut trajectories. HOPE is a
generic spacecraft trajectory navigation analysis tool, utilized to measure
performance of new trajectory generation or navigation software. The HOPE
propagator does not model tether-induced accelerations, but does have geopotential,
atmospheric, and solar radiation models. Additionally, mass, attitude, and payload
door timelines characteristic of TSS-1 mission can be included.
A complete TSS trajectory during which the tether has been cut can be formed by
splicing the STOCS simulated trajectory and the propagation. These spliced
trajectories were used for this study.
Responses to a Loss of Communication Contingency
With some insight into the systems navigating the Shuttle, examining a loss of
communications scenario becomes possible. NASA flight rule 4-50 (Reference 6) sets
a limit on the navigation uncertainty for a deorbit burn. It states the navigational
state error at deorbit must not exceed 20 nautical miles (approximately 37.039
kilometers). Additionally, it states for the case of emergency deorbit with loss of
communications, designers are to assume it will take four revolutions to find an
appropriate landing site.
There are basically four responses to a loss of communications: immediate cut and
return, a partial retrieval and return, a complete retrieval, or a tether length hold
prior to cut and return.
At the time of writing this paper, simulation data for a complete retrieval from
maximum tether length to the boom tip is not available, as the baseline tether
retrieval includes a hold phase at a tether length of 2.4 kilometers (the reader is
again referred to Figure 2). Therefore this option is not considered here.
Immediate Cut Response
Navigational error envelopes were generated for the four revolutions following the
loss of communications. A cut was simulated by propagating the Shuttle state in the
absence of tether accelerations, using a STOCS state-vector as the initial state of the
Shuttle. The identical process was then performed using a state-vector determined
by the onboard systems simulator, SENSOR. After the four revolution propagation,
the resulting trajectories were compared. Any differences were recorded as the
navigational state error of the onboard systems. The time of the tether cut was
incremented in fifteen minute steps.
The navigational error of the onboard system during the nominal mission appears in
Figure 4. The data shown represents the navigational error after the four orbital
periods. The navigational error never exceeds 30 kilometers, and Flight Rule 4-50 is
not violated. The maximum error occurs at the onset of the onstation portion,
reflecting the effect of the system center of mass moving away from the Shuttle
center of mass on Shuttle navigation. After the first uplink during the onstation
portion, the navigation systems begin to maintain an accurate state when compared
to the simulation. Navigational accuracy improves with constant measurement
biases and small perturbative forces. Furthermore, note the decrease in error during
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the first reel in of the retrieval phase of the mission (approximately 53,000 seconds to
80,000 seconds). Because the two centers of mass are approaching each other,
navigational performance improves in the absence of perturbing accelerations.
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Figure 4: Nominal Mission Navigational Error After 4 Revolutions
Figure 5 shows the onboard navigational performance during a TSS mission with
current flowing• through the tether. The current is first turned on when the tether
is fully deployed to a final length of 20 kilometers (at an approximate mission clasped
time of 20,000 seconds). The onboard state error approaches 37 kilometers at this
time. After an uplink, providing the onboard systems with an accurate state and
constant observational biases, the navigational state error four revolutions after the
tether cut increases to within 160 meters of violating NASA flight rule 4-50. Because
these data were generated following current navigational procedures, it is very
likely this situation could occur during the course of the actual mission. An
immediate cut and deorbit response is inappropriate for TSS-1.
The presence of perturbing accelerations induced by the tether cause the onboard
state to quickly degrade. Similar to the nominal profile, note the initial improvement
in onboard navigational performance during retrieval. Following an uplink in the
middle of the onstation phase, however, the navigational error begins to grow,
unlike the nominal case. Out-of-plane tether librations (see Figure 6) cause the
Vernier Reaction Control System (VRCS) to hit roll and yaw deadbands, increasing
the number of VRCS jet firings. These jet firings increase navigational degradation.
Out-of-plane librations are the result of electrodynamical interactions of the tether
and the Earth's magnetic field, begun during the onstation period. Because the
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Shuttle's trajectory is inclined with respect to the magnetic field lines, the tether
electrodynamic force contains a component perpendicular to the Shuttle's orbital
plane. At full deployment, the librations are relatively small and benign. As the
tether length decreases, however, these librations increase in amplitude, resulting
in more frequent RCS deadbanding.
Partial Retrieval and Cut
In a partial retrieval, followed by a tether cut, the tether is assumed to be reeled in
following a nominal tether length profile to a given tether length and then cut. The
loss of communications was assumed to occur just prior to an uplink, representing a
worst case scenario. A electrodynamic mission profile was used, with the uplinks
modified to place the missed uplink at the onset of retrieval. Onboard navigational
errors were determined for a period of four revolutions after the beginning of
retrieval.
In Figure 7, navigational error data show navigational performance improves in a
loss of communications contingency if the tether is partially reeled in prior to
cutting. A cut at 20 kilometers represents an immediate cut (in which the onboard
navigational system performed unacceptably), demonstrating an error of 41
kilometers at the end of the four revolution period. Figure 8 compares the onboard
navigational state to a simulated cut tether trajectory. The navigational state error
grows linearly approximately 35 kilometers in four revolutions, or 8.75 kilometers
per revolution.
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As the tether is further shortened, navigational accuracy improves. The closer the
satellite is reeled in, the better the navigational performance. At a tether length of 3
kilometers, the final navigation error is approximately 22 kilometers, well within the
limits set by the NASA flight rule. A comparison similar to Figure 8 appears in Figure
9 for a partial retrieve to a final tether length of 3 kilometers. Note the navigational
error growth rate after the tether cut is close to that of an immediate cut,
approximately 8.75 kilometers per revolution. The increase in performance occurs
during the retrieval portion of the response, due to the relatively slower
navigational error growth rate.
Tether Length Hold Prior to Cut
The simplest operational response to a loss of communications contingency is to do
nothing. In the TSS-1 mission, doing nothing means holding the tether length
constant, and cutting the tether at the last possible moment before deorbit
preparation must begin.
This response has a number of advantages. Because the Orbiter does not alter its orbit
significantly until just prior to the deorbit burn, the onboard navigational systems
propagate Shuttle state more accurately. Due to the operational simplicity of this
response, a double failure is much less likely. The systems supporting the tether are
used minimally, and it is less likely something else would go wrong.
The navigational crror just prior to the dcorbit burn for a 3 revolution hold followed
by a tcthcr cut appears in Figure 10. The loss of communications was assumed to
occur just prior to an uplink in the middle of the onstation phase. The final error
during this response is 23.5 kilometers, well within the limit set by the NASA flight
rule.
45.0
40.0
_- ]5.0
b.]
C_ 30.0 "
t--,
Z
25.0.QC:
,r
z
20.0
F-,
n 15.0
(X=
tO.O
(=3
5.0
D.O
0.0 •0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 7,0 8.0
TIME (SCC.) wIO'
Figure 8: Eiectrodynamic Mission Navigational Error Growth Cut at 20 km
178
45.0 -
40.0 •
35.0
v
C,J
C3 30.0
I-
X
_.0 25.0
Z
C3 20.0
I--
(../3
C3
O_ 15.0
OZ
tr-
.J
10.0
5.0
0.0" ............ i m ....
0.0 ! .0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 7.0 8.0
TIME 15£C.1 _I04
Figure 9: Electrodynamic Mission Navigational Error Growth - Cut at 3 km
45.0
#0.0
35.0
rm 30.0
_ 25.0(12
r"
Z
(:3 20.0
U_
{L 15.0
n-
I
10.0
5.0
0°0"
_,_.---_L j
0.0 $.0
f
J
I0.0 15.0 20.0 25.0 30.0 35.0 40.0 45.0 50.0 55.0 60.0 65.0 70.0
TIME 15EC.) wlO"
Figure 10: Comparison of Onboard vs. Simulated Trajectories - 3 Rcv Hold and Cut
179
Conclusions
A cut tether contingency does not represent a threat to the a tethered system mission,
provided the onboard navigation systems have contact with the ground. Although
the onboard navigational error grows at an alarming rate immediately after a tether
cut, the onboard systems can be reset with an uplink from the ground systems. Once
reset, the onboard systems perform accurately.
During a loss of communications contingency, however, an incorrect action during
the tether cut can threaten the mission, to the point of violation of NASA flight rules.
Appropriate action requires not cutting the tether immediately after losing
communications.
Tether retrieval, even partially, improves navigational performance. A tether hold
offers an attractive alternative to retrieval, demonstrating comparable accuracy
while remaining operationally simpler. The price for this simplicity, however, is
loss of the satellite.
The benefits of retrieving the satellite outweigh reduced onboard navigational
performance, provided existing flight rules are not violated. Therefore the best
response to a loss of communications contingency would simply be to do nothing for
as long as possible while attempting to reestablish contact with the ground systems.
This response offers acceptable navigational accuracy, and is operationally simple.
If contact can be reestablished, the satellite can be recovered.
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